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Is There a ‘Dark Side’ to Monitoring?  
 
Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness 
 
 
Research summary. We investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional 
shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 
1997-2006.  Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a ‘raise all boats’ view of 
monitoring.  We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double-edged sword that limits CEO 
discretion to undertake both value-destroying M&A deals and value-creating ones.  Our findings indicate that 
the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed.  Rather 
than ‘raising all boats’ in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower 
M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains.   
 
Managerial summary. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a quintessential corporate activity.  There were 
$3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&As often perform 
poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large 
shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall.  Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEOs’ discretion 
to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring 
limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains.  Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that 
constraining executives’ ability to pursue value-destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or 
enable CEOs to pursue value-creating deals.
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After more than two decades of governance reforms addressing questionable corporate practices and 
shareholder discontent (Stout, 2012), scholars and practitioners continue to call for greater accountability of 
CEOs to firm shareholders (Bebchuk, 2005, 2013).  Nowhere is the need for accountability more evident than 
in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as extensive prior research reports that M&As fail to create 
shareholder value and often destroy it (Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan, 1992; King et al., 2004).  Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) estimate that acquiring firms’ shareholders lost twelve cents for each dollar 
spent on M&As.  Such losses, however, do not prevent executives from personally benefiting from 
acquisitions (Harford and Li, 2007).  Moreover, M&As often herald long-term performance declines (Healy, 
Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Sirower, 1997), result in subsequent divestitures (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992), 
and are increasingly likely to attract shareholder lawsuits (Daines and Koumrian, 2012).  Despite negative 
empirical evidence, M&As remain popular with executives (Haleblian et al., 2009), and in 2015 the ‘urge to 
merge’ led to a record $3.8 trillion worth of M&As (Baigorri, 2016).  
Would more accountability of CEOs to their boards of directors and shareholders resolve these 
issues with M&A performance?  The evidence on the effectiveness of monitoring by directors and institutional 
shareholders is at best mixed (e.g. Dalton and Dalton, 2011).  We argue that the failure to substantiate a 
systematic relationship between monitoring and firm performance is largely due to the conflation of two 
separate assumptions: 1) that monitoring will restrain managerial actions that lead to firm losses; and 2) that 
monitoring will encourage managerial actions that lead to firm gains.  Given these assumptions, the 
governance literature has largely adopted a ‘raise all boats’ view of monitoring, positing that it will improve the 
odds of good outcomes and reduce the odds of bad ones (Dalton et al., 1998, 2003).  Paul (2007: 760) states, 
for example, that: “independent boards are perceived to be effective monitors in that they increase (decrease) 
the likelihood of good (bad) corporate decisions.”   
We examine these two assumptions separately in the M&A context by investigating whether 
monitoring constrains CEOs’ discretion to pursue M&A deals leading to big losses without constraining their 
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discretion to pursue deals that lead to big gains.  We question the assumption that vigilant monitoring will 
raise all boats and, instead, develop theoretical arguments that monitoring by directors and shareholders is 
more likely to ensure that managers do not destroy shareholder value than it is to ensure value creation.   
Our contribution to prior research is twofold.  First, despite the strategic importance of M&As and their 
crucial impact on firm performance (Harford and Li, 2007), knowledge remains limited regarding the drivers of 
good-versus-bad M&A performance (King et al., 2004; Kroll, Walters, and Wright, 2008).  We address this by 
examining the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders on M&A performance 
extremeness: i.e., big gains and big losses.  Second, M&As failure to create value for acquiring firms’ 
shareholders (King et al., 2004) has been attributed to self-serving or over-confident executives.  The 
corporate governance literature, however, has been inconclusive about the effects of monitoring by boards of 
directors and institutional shareholders on firm performance (Bergh et al., 2016; Dalton and Dalton, 2011).  
We shed light on these equivocal results by distinguishing the effect of monitoring on preventing the 
squandering of firms’ resources from its effect on the pursuit of value-creating strategies.  For instance, while 
agency theory emphasizes boards of directors as vigilant monitors who constrain CEOs’ ability to pursue self-
serving or hubris-driven strategies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983), resource dependence theory 
depicts directors as active participants in strategic decision-making who contribute counsel, advice, and 
expertise to the firm (Hillman, 2005).  By exploring whether these different roles support the prevention of 
value-destroying and/or promotion of value-creating strategies, we contribute to a small but growing research 
stream that questions the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to corporate governance (Dowell, Shackell, and Stuart, 
2011; Shi, Connelly, and Hoskisson, In Press).  
Failures of compensation-alignment mechanisms have spurred renewed interest in monitoring by 
boards of directors and large shareholders (Campbell et al., 2012; Desender et al., 2013).  Our approach 
harkens back to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976: 335) warning that solutions to agency problems, which reduce 
CEOs’ opportunities to maximize their own utility at the expense of firm shareholders, can have a downside 
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for firm performance by affecting whether managers undertake high- or low-variance projects.  Our findings 
indicate that monitoring oversight indeed constrains big M&A losses, but also constrains big gains.  We 
therefore provide preliminary evidence that vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and institutional 
shareholders has salutatory effects on M&A losses, but corresponding “dark side” effects that limit M&A gains.  
HYPOTHESES 
Boards of directors.  The board’s oversight role has dominated governance research (Tuggle et al., 2010). 
Still, “there is no evidence of systematic relationship between board composition and corporate financial 
performance” (Dalton et al., 2007:11).  Bergh et al. (2016) meta-analysis finds that board independence and 
leadership are not related to firm performance, yet these are two key factors underlying institutional pressures 
for improving board oversight by increasing independence (Krause and Semadeni, 2014).  Independent 
(outside) directors are more likely to provide objective and vigilant monitoring, ensuring that managers do not 
pursue their self-interests at the expense of corporate shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  On the other hand, such independent directors have limited time and resources to devote to 
the firm (McNulty, Florackis, and Ormrod, 2013), and are likely to be less knowledgeable about the firm’s 
operations and strategic challenges than insiders (Dalton et al., 2007; Desender et al., 2013).  Moreover, 
outside directors, with more limited familiarity with firm operations, may emphasize short-term financial 
metrics (Shen, 2003) and could contribute to corporate myopia (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  
CEO duality, another closely investigated board construct (Krause and Semadeni, 2014), has also 
received limited empirical support; “there is no evidence of substantive, systematic relationships between 
corporate financial performance and board leadership structure” (Dalton and Dalton, 2011: 408).  Agency 
theorists argue that CEOs who serve as board chair weaken their boards’ monitoring and control (Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989).  Others, however, caution that a unified leadership structure could promote 
decision accountability (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), forestall organizational inertia (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991), and enable CEOs to respond more promptly to external events (Boyd, 1995).   
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The complexity of a board’s roles (McNulty et al., 2013; Westphal, 1999) becomes apparent in the 
M&A context.  While vigilant boards should constrain CEOs’ ability to pursue disastrous deals, the board’s 
effect on value-creating strategies is less clear.  On one hand, vigilant boards should serve as a brake on 
managers’ opportunity to pursue self-serving strategies (Stiles, 2001).  When the board faces a decision to 
accept, reject, or refer an M&A proposal, boards exercising their oversight function should be able to “ensure 
that something stupid is not being done, for example, somebody pursuing a major investment which clearly 
does not have a sensible financial return” (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999: 61).  On the other hand, however, a 
board’s focus on vigilant monitoring may constrain the board’s ability to effectively contribute to value-creating 
strategies, due to the inherent challenges of combining supervisory and control roles with advisory and 
collaborative roles (Baldenius, Melamud, and Meng, 2014; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  Westphal 
(1999), for example, argues that friendship ties between directors and executives promote advice-seeking and 
could improve the quality of a firm’s strategic decision making.  Friendship ties also could undermine board’s 
supervisory function, however, and specifically its objective monitoring of the CEO. 
More time devoted by the board to supervisory activities may come at the expense of its advisory 
service (Baldenius et al., 2014).  For instance, Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) find that the majority of a 
board’s time is spent on supervisory issues rather than on strategic ones.  Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 
(2011) also report that an emphasis on monitoring by independent boards comes at the price of a weakened 
strategic advisory function, especially as it relates to acquisitions.  Furthermore, directors’ whose abilities and 
dispositions are honed for objective monitoring may not possess the abilities required for effective 
contributions to the firm’s value-creating strategies.  In order to contribute to strategic decision-making, 
directors need a familiarity with the company’s operations and an in-depth understanding of its strategies and 
challenges (Stiles, 2001).  Outside directors’ ability to contribute to the value-creation function of the firm 
could thus be constrained by information asymmetries relative to corporate insiders (Desender et al., 2013; 
Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010) and by the higher information costs these directors face in 
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understanding the implications of strategic decisions for the firm (Dalton et al., 2007; Westphal, 1999).  In 
addition to firm-specific knowledge, board effectiveness in decision-making requires collaboration (McNulty et 
al., 2013).  Directors may rationally seek to distance themselves from corporate managers, however, in order 
to enhance their ability to provide objective oversight (Faleye et al., 2011).  Finally, directors’ participation in 
strategic decision-making blurs the boundaries between decision-making and decision-control, by requiring 
directors to provide objective oversight of the decisions they help to shape.  This could also compromise 
decision accountability by shifting responsibility from the CEO to the board. 
Rather than decrease the likelihood of value-destroying M&A deals directly, vigorous board oversight 
may reduce managerial willingness to take on those particularly risky deals that may have very good or very 
bad outcomes.  From a managerial perspective, a strong focus on monitoring may intensify executives’ 
defensiveness (Westphal, 1999) and create friction between the board and the CEO (Roberts, 2001).  CEOs 
may interpret vigilant monitoring as distrust, ‘second-guessing’ their decisions, or a “lack of respect for the 
position of the CEO” (McDonald and Westphal, 2010: 347).  CEOs could resist by controlling information flows 
(de Villiers, Naiker, and van Staden, 2011) or using impression management tactics (Westphal and Bednar, 
2008).  Controls that constrain CEO discretion may not only shift the locus of control from executives to the 
board, but could also affect CEO motivation (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003: 405).  In an experimental 
study, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that monitoring decreases the performance of intrinsically motivated 
agents, with agents penalizing controlling principals when they perceive monitoring as a sign of distrust, lack 
of autonomy, or greed.  Research also warns that tight financial controls could result in shortened time 
horizons and risk-avoidance behavior (Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1991).  Finally, CEOs may become unwilling 
to discuss the firm’s problems freely, so as not to admit their own limitations in solving them (Westphal, 1999).  
Although friendship ties between executives and directors could enhance CEOs’ trust in their boards’ support 
and thus encourage advice-seeking (Westphal, 1999), a focus on monitoring could exacerbate CEOs “fears of 
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appearing uncertain or incompetent, or acknowledging dependence” (Roberts, 2001: 1560). CEOs thus may 
be less willing to seek board’s advice when facing vigilant monitoring.   
To summarize, board monitoring will affect M&A performance extremeness by reducing both bad 
deals and good ones.  Although board monitoring should constrain value-destroying deals, monitoring is also 
likely to decrease the odds for big gains due to the inherent tensions between the board’s oversight and 
advisory roles.  Contributing to good corporate decisions requires less separation between management and 
board, with directors actively providing counsel, advice, and expertise in strategic decision-making and 
managers sharing information with the board and seeking directors’ input (Hillman, 2005; Westphal, 1999).  
Vigilant monitoring, on the other hand, requires separation of decision making and control, and an impartial, 
more socially distant relationship between the board and the CEO (Westphal, 1999), so as to constrain 
managerial influence and power over the board and to promote board’s independence and objectivity in 
exercising oversight over managerial decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980).  Consequently, we expect 
that board monitoring will act as a double-edged sword, limiting the pursuit of both bad and good M&A deals.  
Hypothesis 1: Board monitoring will be associated with less-extreme M&A returns, due to fewer big 
losses and fewer big gains.  
Institutional shareholders.  Institutional shareholders have a vested interest in monitoring M&A deals 
because M&As affect shareholder value.  Large institutional shareholders, due to the size of their holdings, 
have more to lose and thus greater incentives to monitor, but they also are more likely to gain access to and 
receive special attention from management (Useem, 1996).  Schnatterly, Shaw, and Jennings (2008), for 
instance, theorize and find that the largest institutional shareholder holds an information advantage and is 
better positioned to monitor the firm.  Agency theory prescriptions are unclear, however, as to whether large 
shareholders’ influence on corporate outcomes would constrain value-destroying deals and promote value-
creating ones, or whether their influence is more limited to the prevention of disastrous deals.  On one hand, 
large, powerful and better-informed institutional investors are well positioned to monitor corporate executives 
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(e.g. Schnatterly et al., 2008) and to prevent value-destroying M&A deals, and they are motivated because 
they stand to lose more if an acquisition destroys shareholder value (e.g. Moeller et al., 2005; King et al., 
2004).  Luo (2005), for instance, reports that companies are more likely to backtrack and withdraw from 
proposed M&A deals when they are met with negative stock market reaction. On the other hand, increased 
accountability to the firm’s shareholders may prompt corporate executives to engage in more conservative 
strategies, thus constraining not only big losses stemming from M&As, but also potentially constraining big 
gains.  Although some scholars argue that increased accountability of corporate chiefs to their shareholders 
should encourage them to undertake more value-creating strategies that lead to overall improvements in firm 
performance (Bebchuk, 2005), Jensen and Meckling (1976: 335) warn that solutions to agency problems 
could affect whether managers undertake high- or-low variance projects.  If shareholder monitoring constrains 
a CEO’s propensity to engage in high-variance projects, its success at preventing self-serving strategies that 
destroy value could come at the price of missing out on value-creating opportunities, for several reasons.  
First, CEOs facing vigilant shareholder monitoring may prefer to avoid risky strategies if they believe 
that such actions increase their likelihood of dismissal.  Research finds, for example, that executives are more 
likely to lose their jobs following an underperforming acquisition (Lehn and Zhao, 2006).  Second, CEOs may 
seek to minimize the risk of attracting shareholder wrath, because concentration of stock ownership (Davis, 
2013) could affect not only a CEO’s career prospects at the current firm, but also limit their potential for 
leading another firm or serving on corporate boards.  Finally, constraining managerial discretion in order to 
minimize agency costs may also constrain the upside potential that firms could realize from their executives’ 
professional expertise, strategies, and firm-specific knowledge.  The “delegation, or empowering one to act on 
behalf of another, is a sine qua non of the modern firm” (Sengul, Gimeno, and Dial, 2012: 376).  Falk and 
Kosfeld (2006) note, however, that agents exhibit control-averse behavior, and therefore that principal control 
negatively affects agent performance.  They find that while monitoring constrains ‘bad apples,’ and thus 
improves the lower bounds of agent performance, it also imposes costs on the ‘good apples’ that bring down 
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the upper bounds of performance.  In the M&A context, CEOs who jump on the M&A bandwagon later in the 
M&A wave (e.g. McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 2008) may find it easier to justify their actions to the firm’s 
shareholders.  External legitimacy could come at a cost, however, if later movers face a more restricted set of 
potential partners (Carow, Heron, and Saxton, 2004).   
To summarize, vigilant monitoring by institutional shareholders should constrain the pursuit of value-
destroying deals, but could also narrow the set of strategic actions considered by a CEO.  Institutional 
shareholders are likely to feel changes in shareholder wealth most acutely, and are also best positioned to 
monitor and discipline corporate executives.  CEOs may prefer to tread lightly and favor strategies that are 
easy to justify to influential shareholders.  Monitoring by large shareholders, therefore, could not only limit 
CEOs’ ability to engage in value-destroying M&As, but it could also limit executives’ risk-taking for value-
creating M&As.  Thus:  
Hypothesis 2: Monitoring by institutional investors will be associated with less-extreme M&A returns, 
due to fewer big losses and fewer big gains.  
METHODS 
Sample.  We extracted all M&A deals by publicly traded U.S. firms from the SDC Platinum database for the 
period 1997–2006, for which the value of the deal was disclosed.  We matched these data with stock prices 
from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), accounting and financial data from Compustat,  
institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial 13F database, data on executive compensation and 
ownership from Execucomp, and data on boards of directors and antitakeover provisions from IRRC.  To 
control for M&A experience in the prior 3 years (e.g. Laamanen and Keil, 2008), we extracted Mergerstat data 
for 1995-2006.  Complete data were available for 1451 M&A deals.  
 Dependent variable. Event study methodology has become the dominant method for measuring the 
impact of M&As on firm performance (Haleblian et al., 2009; King et al., 2004).  We calculate cumulative 
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abnormal returns (CARs) by following the Brown and Warner (1985) procedure1 and aggregating ARs for the 
period of three days surrounding the announcement of the deal (Moeller et al., 2005).  While longer periods 
would ensure that all effects are captured, the estimates would be noisier (Weston, Siu, and Johnson, 2001).  
Although widely used, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been criticized for failing to fully capture the 
wealth effect for acquiring firm shareholders (Malatesta, 1983; Moeller et al., 2005).  Moeller and colleagues 
(2005) find that although CARs estimated as percentage returns were not significantly different from zero, this 
number fails to reflect the extensive losses borne by acquiring firms’ shareholders.  As we are interested in 
the overall impact on shareholder wealth, we use abnormal dollar returns; we weight the percentage CARs 
with the firm’s market value two days prior to the M&A announcement in order to estimate how much 
shareholders lose or gain overall as a result of the deal (e.g. Malatesta, 1983; Moeller et al., 2005).  Our 
dependent variable measures how extensively the particular M&A deal affects shareholder wealth.  We took a 
logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable to correct for skewness and kurtosis.  Because this 
treatment estimates CEO propensity to ‘swing for the fences’ without regard whether it leads to shareholder 
losses or gains, in supplementary analyses we also split the sample into M&A losses and M&As gains.  
             Independent variables.  The ability of boards of directors to perform their monitoring duties has been 
a focal point in corporate governance research (Bergh et al., 2016; Dalton et al., 2007; Tuggle et al., 2010).  
We measure board monitoring in two ways. First, we examine board characteristics such as board 
independence and size, CEO duality - the absence of a separate (non-executive) chairperson of the board, 
directors’ ownership in the focal firm, directors’ equity based pay, prior experience with M&As, and how busy 
directors were with appointments on other boards (online appendix 4).  Second, in order to account for board 
variables acting as a bundle, and thus the potential substitute or complementary impact of various board 
measures (i.e. Dalton et al., 2003), we conducted a factor analysis, and include an aggregate measure of 
                                                           
1 , where we estimated the parameters   by regressing the firm’s returns on market returns 
for a period of 240 to 40 days preceding the announcement of the M&A event (Mueller and Sirower, 2003). 
 
mtjjjtjt RRAR βα
ˆˆ −−= jj βα
ˆ,ˆ
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board monitoring.  Institutional ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of total year-end 
shares owned by the top five institutional investors (Sauerwald, Lin and Peng, 2016; Hartzell and Starks, 
2003). These data came from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. 
Controls.  We control for number of factors that could affect either M&A propensity or returns: firm 
size, measured as the natural logarithm of firm assets; growth opportunities - market value/book value of 
equity (Wright et al., 1996); prior performance - ROA; related acquisitions in the same two-digit SIC industry 
(King et al., 2004); deal value logarithmically transformed to correct for skewness and kurtosis; M&A 
experience of the acquiring firm in the prior 3 years (Laamanen and Keil, 2008); free cash flows - operating 
cash flows scaled by assets (Carow et al., 2004); corporate diversification - Herfindahl index, leverage - long-
term debt divided by total assets (e.g. Sauerwald, et al.,, 2016), and relative size of the deal.  Furthermore, we 
control for CEO characteristics and governance environment, such as the CEO career horizon - the number of 
years the CEO has until reaching the age of 70 (Matta and Beamish, 2008); CEO gender, as it could affect 
risk-taking (Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer, 1999); CEO stock options - Black-Scholes value of the options 
granted to the CEO, divided by the total compensation for a 3-year period (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007); 
CEO ownership - percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO at the end of each year; CEO 
confidence in the firm - CEOs’ pattern of holding and exercising their stock options (Campbell et al., 2011); 
and antitakeover provisions - an indicator variable if GIM index is equal to or higher than 10, as takeover 
provisions could protect entrenched CEOs (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2012).  Finally, as CEO’s 
latitude of action could be affected by the firm’s industry or macro environment, we include year and industry 
effects, and control for industry munificence, dynamism, and complexity (Boyd, 1995) at the 4-digit SIC level.  
We measure all explanatory and control variables, other than the focal deal traits, at the end of the year 
preceding the M&A event.  Variance inflation factors revealed that multicolinearity is not problematic.   
Below we report the results using three different methodologies.  First, as recommended by Certo et 
al. (2016), we report OLS with robust standard errors.  Second, to account for potential endogeneity, we run a 
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2SLS (ivregress) model.  We matched each firm with another S&P 1500 firm in the same Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) – a population nucleus with high social and economic integration (Stuart and Sorenson, 
2003), and the same sector as the focal firm.  Although relevant and valid exogenous monitoring instruments 
are hard to find, a neighboring firm’s governance characteristics can represent a good proxy for a focal firm’s 
governance - firms could mimic the attributes of other firms in their locality, but the attributes of other local 
firms do not influence the M&A performance of a focal firm2.  We collected data on board independence, CEO 
duality, board attendance, service on other boards, and board ownership for the matches and used as 
instruments for board governance.  The F statistics for the first stage analysis is 28.1 and significant, greater 
than the customary 10 threshold.  Finally, in order to account for potential self-selection, because 
common/overlapping ownership by institutional investors in the industry may affect M&A odds (e.g. Goranova 
et al., 2010), we utilize Bushee’s (1998) classification and include industry-level transient, dedicated, and 
quasi-indexing ownership as exclusion variables in the first equation of the Heckman selection procedure 
(online appendix 5).   
RESULTS 
Summary statistics and correlations are provided in Table 1.  Consistent with prior research (e.g., Moeller et 
al., 2005), we find that CARs by themselves do not reflect M&As’ impact on shareholder wealth.  By taking the 
absolute values of the dollar-adjusted abnormal returns, we measure how extreme the effect of the M&A deal 
is on shareholder wealth, irrespective of whether the effect is value-creating or value-destroying. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
In Table 2, we present the multivariate analyses of M&A performance extremeness.  Model 1 includes 
all control variables, Model 2 reports the monitoring variables, 2SLS results are presented in Model 3, and 
Model 4 reports the Heckman maximum likelihood findings.  Hypothesis 1 predicted that more vigilant 
                                                           
2
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
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monitoring by boards of directors would lead to less extreme M&A performance. Our overall results in Models 
2-4 provide support for this hypothesis.  Interpreting from model 2, the coefficient for board monitoring is 
negative and significant (-0.167, p<.001), signifying a one standard deviation increase in board monitoring 
reduces the stock market swing (positive or negative) to deal announcement by $158.6 million.  Hypothesis 2 
predicted that monitoring by institutional shareholders would lead to less extreme M&A performance.  Models 
2-4 provide support for this hypothesis.  The institutional ownership concentration coefficient is negative and 
significant (-0.022, p<.001), providing support for Hypothesis 2.  The result is consistent across all models. 
Interpreting from OLS model 2, a one percent increase in institutional ownership concentration, leads to a $22 
million reduction in the stock market swing (positive or negative) to the deal announcement.  Bushee (1998) 
argued that interest in monitoring by institutional investors varied by type of manager, thus we calculated firm 
ownership by each class of institutional owner using his classification.  In supplementary analyses, we 
replaced institutional ownership concentration with percent of firm holding by each type of manager.  The 
results (available in online appendix 1) were consistent with dedicated institutional ownership negatively 
influencing performance extremeness across all models. Furthermore, we also examine the effects of 
monitoring separately for M&A deals that destroy shareholder wealth (online appendix 2) and deals that 
create value for shareholders (online appendix 3). These results indicate that the impact of monitoring on 
extreme performance is not due solely to constraining shareholder losses.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by explicitly considering both the benefits and 
costs of monitoring mechanisms.  We find that monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders 
is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains – that is, board monitoring does not 
promote a universal, ‘raising all boats’ shift towards better performance.  Although monitoring reduces 
executives’ propensities to make excessively risky M&A investments, it also serves as a double-edged sword.  
On one hand, monitoring can eliminate behaviors that should not occur, such as self-interested CEOs 
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destroying or expropriating shareholder value.  On the other hand, monitoring also can constrain behaviors 
that shareholders favor - those that could create shareholder value.  Therefore, rather than constraining loss-
inducing risks and promoting gain-worthy ones, monitoring seems to constrain the investment options 
considered by the CEOs, thereby eliminating both very good and very bad ‘apples’.  
Our study is not without limitations.  Despite attempts to be comprehensive in our selection of board 
variables, including robustness checks with additional board-related measures, our use of archival data limits 
our ability to capture the effectiveness of board monitoring and the social, political, and psychological 
dynamics of the relationships between executives and directors.  Opening the black box of boards’ functioning 
by analyzing the board’s minutes (e.g. Tuggle et al., 2010) may be illuminating regarding the roles of directors 
in M&As.  Although the relationship between the CEO and the board of directors is of central importance in 
corporate governance (Shen, 2003), we have limited understanding of how directors juggle the roles of 
control, strategy, and service (McNulty et al., 2013).  We also need to learn how directors from different 
backgrounds prioritize monitoring vs. their strategic advisory function, and how these affect the quality of 
board-management interactions. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) warned that solutions to agency problems come at a cost.  Our findings 
– that board and shareholder monitoring constrains both big losses and big gains – indicates one such cost.  
Given these findings, is the pursuit of a direct link between monitoring and firm performance a ‘false grail?’3  
Or, might the equivocal relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance 
reported by prior research (Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Dalton et al., 2003, 2007) be driven by inappropriate, 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches to corporate governance (Wowak and Hambrick, 2010) that fail to account for 
factors like CEOs’ values, capabilities, and intrinsic motivation?  Although agency theory is the dominant 
perspective in corporate governance research (Dalton et al., 2007), it is inherently a financial, and not a 
strategic, theory (Bettis, 1983).  In its preoccupation with the redistribution of firm value between managers 
                                                           
3
 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
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and shareholders, agency theory fails to offer principle-based propositions for creating sustainable corporate 
value.  On one hand, vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders could help 
companies avoid situations such as HP’s acquisition of Autonomy, where four-fifths of the M&A price was 
subsequently written down.  On the other hand, the prevention of value destruction should not come at the 
cost of limiting M&As and other strategic undertakings that could build and strengthen the firm’s competitive 
position (e.g. Chatterjee, 1986).  Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining 
executives’ ability to pursue value-destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEOs 
to pursue value-creating deals.  No single study, however, can provide conclusive evidence.  Future research 
investigating how governance could limit the potential for bad or self-serving managerial decisions, while 
encouraging strategies that create long-term shareholder value would be of great value.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
# Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 
M&A extremeness 
|$M| 998.6 3176 1                       
2 Firm size (sales $B) 10.7 19.6 0.45 1                     
3 Growth 2.71 1.94 0.37 0.00 1                   
4 Profitability  0.06 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.27 1                 
5 Same industry deal 0.55 0.50 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 1               
6 Deal value  594.9 3472 0.24 0.18 -0.01 0.04 0.12 1             
7 M&A experience 4.94 7.32 0.29 0.23 0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.05 1           
8 Cash flows 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.36 0.59 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 1         
9 Diversification 0.32 0.29 0.00 0.07 -0.20 -0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.26 -0.16 1       
10 Career horizon 14.7 6.9 -0.03 -0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.03 -0.14 1     
11 CEO gender 0.01 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.07 0.14 -0.04 0.02 1   
12 CEO stock options  44.6 24.7 0.25 0.02 0.24 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.17 -0.17 0.14 0.04 1 
13 CEO ownership  0.74 2.79 -0.21 -0.20 -0.10 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 0.09 -0.16 0.04 -0.17 
14 Leverage 0.18 0.15 -0.16 -0.08 -0.26 -0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.19 0.11 -0.15 -0.09 -0.25 
15 Relative size 0.10 0.26 0.00 -0.10 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.46 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
16 Nonconfident CEO 0.28 0.45 -0.21 -0.07 -0.25 -0.23 0.04 -0.02 -0.13 -0.14 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.10 
17 
Antitakeover 
provisions 0.53 0.50 -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.13 -0.01 0.07 -0.16 
18 Industry munificence 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.05 -0.12 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.02 
19 Industry dynamism 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.14 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.03 
20 Industry complexity 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.17 -0.11 0.02 -0.12 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13 
21 Board monitoring  -0.07 0.95 -0.41 -0.42 0.06 -0.07 0.05 -0.21 -0.32 0.04 -0.18 0.23 0.05 0.02 
22 
Ownership 
concentration 24.6 8.7 -0.38 -0.31 -0.22 -0.15 0.07 -0.11 -0.22 -0.14 -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.10 
Notes: N = 1,451. Italicized correlations are statistically significant at p<0.05.                   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (cont.) 
# Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
13 CEO ownership  1                 
14 Leverage 0.26 1               
15 Relative size 0.03 0.02 1             
16 Nonconfident CEO -0.02 0.07 0.01 1           
17 Antitakeover provisions 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.09 1         
18 Industry munificence 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 1       
19 Industry dynamism 0.01 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.55 1     
20 Industry complexity -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.07 1   
21 Board monitoring  0.12 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 -0.11 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 1 
22 Ownership concentration 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.21 
Notes: N = 1,451. Italicized correlations are statistically significant at p<0.05.       
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Table 2. Monitoring and M&A extremeness 
  Model 1 (OLS)   Model 2 (OLS)   Model 3 (2SLS)   Model 4 (Heckman)   
Variable β SE P>t   β SE P>t   β SE P>z   β SE P>z   
Intercept 2.533 0.35 0.00   3.818 0.39 0.00   8.968 2.96 0.00   4.496 0.54 0.00   
Firm size  0.856 0.03 0.00   0.771 0.04 0.00   0.183 0.33 0.58   0.742 0.04 0.00   
Growth 0.326 0.03 0.00   0.315 0.03 0.00   0.346 0.07 0.00   0.302 0.03 0.00   
Profitability  -0.159 0.49 0.75   -0.243 0.48 0.61   -1.076 0.56 0.05   -0.346 0.48 0.47   
Same industry deal 0.099 0.08 0.21   0.131 0.08 0.09   0.151 0.14 0.28   0.149 0.08 0.06   
Deal value  0.061 0.02 0.01   0.054 0.02 0.02   0.050 0.04 0.26   0.059 0.02 0.01   
M&A experience 0.010 0.01 0.09   0.004 0.01 0.56   -0.046 0.03 0.09   -0.014 0.01 0.21   
Cash flows -1.212 0.63 0.06   -1.135 0.61 0.06   -0.561 1.17 0.63   -1.267 0.61 0.04   
Diversification -0.024 0.14 0.86   -0.043 0.14 0.76   0.300 0.27 0.27   -0.102 0.14 0.48   
Career horizon 0.006 0.01 0.33   0.009 0.01 0.15   0.044 0.02 0.06   0.013 0.01 0.06   
CEO gender -0.197 0.40 0.62   -0.179 0.37 0.63   -0.287 0.41 0.48   -0.141 0.36 0.70   
CEO stock options  0.011 0.00 0.00   0.011 0.00 0.00   0.007 0.00 0.05   0.010 0.00 0.00   
CEO ownership  -0.018 0.02 0.35   -0.016 0.02 0.38   0.021 0.05 0.68   -0.018 0.02 0.34   
Leverage -0.767 0.32 0.02   -0.563 0.32 0.08   -0.074 0.59 0.90   -0.446 0.32 0.17   
Relative size 0.527 0.15 0.00   0.529 0.15 0.00   0.487 0.35 0.17   0.536 0.15 0.00   
Nonconfident CEO -0.248 0.09 0.01   -0.264 0.09 0.00   -0.915 0.38 0.02   -0.257 0.09 0.00   
Antitakeover provisions -0.109 0.08 0.16   -0.131 0.08 0.09   -0.923 0.37 0.01   -0.133 0.08 0.08   
Industry munificence 3.241 1.07 0.00   2.952 1.07 0.01   4.309 2.12 0.04   2.976 1.06 0.01   
Industry dynamism 7.415 2.33 0.00   7.110 2.28 0.00   4.454 3.58 0.21   5.264 2.35 0.03   
Industry complexity -0.784 1.14 0.49   -0.428 1.16 0.71   0.399 2.39 0.87   -0.416 1.18 0.72   
Board monitoring          -0.167 0.06 0.00   -1.783 1.00 0.07   -0.184 0.06 0.00   
Ownership concentration         -0.022 0.00 0.00   -0.030 0.01 0.00   -0.023 0.00 0.00   
Industry   Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes     
Year   Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes     
Mills lambda                         -0.367 0.18     
F-test   78.2 0.00     76.5 0.00       
 
      
 
  
Wald χ2                   668.6 0.00     1695.7 0.00   
R square    0.597       0.605                     
Joint F-test (OLS) or χ2-test         15.57 0.00     16.04 0.00     34.31 0.00   
Observations   1451       1451       729       1418     
Robust standard errors, two-tailed tests are reported for all models. 
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Appendix 1. Monitoring and M&A Extremeness: Robustness Checks with Dedicated Institutional Ownership and Top Institutional Investor
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (2SLS) Model 3 (Heckman) Model 4 (OLS) Model 5 (2SLS) Model 6 (Heckman)
Variable
Intercept
Firm size 
Growth
Profitability 
Same industry deal
Deal value 
M&A experience
Cash flows
Diversification
Career horizon
CEO gender
CEO stock options 
CEO ownership 
Leverage
Relative size
Nonconfident CEO
Antitakeover provisions
Industry munificence
Industry dynamism
Industry complexity
Transient ownership
Quasi-indexer ownership
Board monitoring 
Dedicated ownership
β SE
3.207 0.43
0.807 0.04
0.320 0.03
-0.102 0.48
0.111 0.08
0.062 0.02
0.006 0.01
-1.106 0.63
-0.067 0.14
0.011 0.01
-0.172 0.37
0.011 0.00
-0.011 0.02
-0.706 0.32
0.487 0.14
-0.294 0.09
-0.160 0.08
3.014 1.10
6.534 2.36
-0.232 1.17
0.093 0.402
-0.553 0.321
-0.170 0.06
-1.224 0.61
P>t
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.83
0.16
0.01
0.34
0.08
0.64
0.08
0.65
0.00
0.57
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.84
0.82
0.09
0.00
0.05
β SE
7.354 2.18
0.396 0.21
0.407 0.05
-0.726 0.49
0.136 0.12
0.082 0.04
-0.025 0.02
-1.000 0.91
0.269 0.24
0.032 0.01
-0.292 0.42
0.009 0.00
0.015 0.04
-0.207 0.53
0.389 0.27
-0.774 0.24
-0.734 0.22
3.778 1.82
4.515 3.25
0.310 2.13
-1.874 0.935
-1.771 0.707
-1.128 0.57
-1.610 0.99
P>z
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.14
0.27
0.04
0.12
0.27
0.25
0.03
0.49
0.00
0.71
0.70
0.15
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.17
0.88
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.10
β SE
3.986 0.58
0.769 0.04
0.311 0.03
-0.217 0.48
0.131 0.08
0.068 0.02
-0.011 0.01
-1.252 0.63
-0.120 0.14
0.015 0.01
-0.151 0.37
0.011 0.00
-0.012 0.02
-0.562 0.32
0.490 0.14
-0.302 0.09
-0.169 0.08
3.053 1.09
5.011 2.41
-0.108 1.18
-0.416 0.46
-0.555 0.32
-0.190 0.06
-1.348 0.61
P>z
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.65
0.10
0.01
0.32
0.05
0.40
0.03
0.68
0.00
0.54
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.93
0.36
0.08
0.00
0.03
β SE
3.552 0.38
0.780 0.04
0.317 0.03
-0.376 0.48
0.123 0.08
0.056 0.02
0.004 0.01
-0.788 0.63
-0.057 0.14
0.009 0.01
-0.101 0.37
0.010 0.00
-0.018 0.02
-0.494 0.32
0.514 0.15
-0.268 0.09
-0.141 0.08
3.028 1.06
7.781 2.28
-0.637 1.15
-0.180 0.06
P>t
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.44
0.11
0.02
0.54
0.21
0.69
0.17
0.79
0.00
0.33
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.58
0.00
β SE
11.736 3.57
-0.179 0.40
0.291 0.08
-1.390 0.68
0.146 0.18
0.055 0.06
-0.072 0.03
0.543 1.38
0.369 0.33
0.069 0.03
-0.229 0.47
0.005 0.00
0.059 0.07
-0.015 0.69
0.348 0.50
-1.315 0.43
-1.328 0.45
5.340 2.59
5.729 4.70
1.948 2.98
-2.914 1.15
P>z
0.00
0.65
0.00
0.04
0.41
0.32
0.02
0.69
0.27
0.02
0.63
0.24
0.39
0.98
0.49
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.22
0.51
0.01
β SE
4.257 0.53
0.747 0.04
0.303 0.03
-0.466 0.48
0.140 0.08
0.061 0.02
-0.014 0.01
-0.947 0.63
-0.117 0.14
0.013 0.01
-0.059 0.37
0.010 0.00
-0.022 0.02
-0.392 0.33
0.517 0.15
-0.264 0.09
-0.148 0.08
3.171 1.06
6.111 2.35
-0.518 1.16
-0.202 0.06
P>z
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.33
0.07
0.01
0.20
0.13
0.42
0.06
0.87
0.00
0.26
0.23
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.01
0.66
0.00
Top institutional investor
Industry
Year
Mills lambda
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-0.362 0.19
-0.045 0.01
Yes
Yes
0.00 -0.058 0.02
Yes
Yes
0.02 -0.046 0.01
Yes
Yes
-0.386 0.19
0.00
F-test
Wald χ2
R square 
70.4
0.60
0.00
903.7 0.00 1665.4 0.00
78.1
0.61
0.00
425.5 0.00 1731.7 0.00
Joint F-test (OLS) or χ2-tes
Observations
Robust standard errors, two-t
t 6.49
1436
ailed tests are report
0.00
ed for all
5.14
718
 models.
0.08 15.71
1403
0.00 15.39
1462
0.00 10.41
737
0.01 35.07
1427
0.00
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Appendix 2. Monitoring and Absolute Shareholder Losses from M&As
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (OLS) Model 3 (2SLS) Model 4 (Heckman)
Variable
Intercept
Firm size 
Growth
Profitability 
Same industry deal
Deal value 
M&A experience
Cash flows
Diversification
Career horizon
CEO gender
CEO stock options 
CEO ownership 
Leverage
Relative size
Nonconfident CEO
Antitakeover provisions
Industry munificence
Industry dynamism
Industry complexity
Board monitoring 
Owner monitoring
Industry
Year
Mills lambda
β SE
2.858 0.55
0.855 0.04
0.330 0.04
0.640 0.80
-0.085 0.11
0.088 0.03
0.009 0.01
-2.062 0.92
-0.321 0.19
0.001 0.01
-0.062 0.40
0.011 0.00
-0.013 0.03
-1.256 0.40
0.561 0.20
-0.063 0.13
0.120 0.11
3.261 1.65
8.899 3.89
-2.837 1.71
Yes
Yes
P>t
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.42
0.45
0.01
0.28
0.03
0.10
0.95
0.88
0.00
0.62
0.00
0.01
0.63
0.27
0.05
0.02
0.10
β SE
4.334 0.58
0.752 0.05
0.317 0.04
0.470 0.77
-0.045 0.11
0.084 0.03
0.002 0.01
-1.838 0.90
-0.374 0.19
0.005 0.01
-0.081 0.33
0.011 0.00
-0.009 0.03
-0.990 0.40
0.490 0.19
-0.076 0.13
0.079 0.10
2.994 1.66
8.072 3.86
-2.528 1.85
-0.218 0.09
-0.023 0.01
Yes
Yes
P>t
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.54
0.69
0.01
0.78
0.04
0.05
0.65
0.80
0.00
0.73
0.01
0.01
0.56
0.45
0.07
0.04
0.17
0.01
0.00
β SE P>z
7.843 2.02 3.88 0.00
0.369 0.22 1.65 0.10
0.423 0.06 7.33 0.00
-1.013 0.73 -1.39 0.16
0.073 0.18 0.40 0.69
0.125 0.06 2.16 0.03
-0.032 0.02 -1.72 0.09
-0.523 1.21 -0.43 0.67
0.033 0.33 0.10 0.92
0.000 0.02 0.01 1.00
0.062 0.45 0.14 0.89
0.001 0.00 0.35 0.73
-0.072 0.04 -1.96 0.05
-0.531 0.67 -0.79 0.43
0.377 0.37 1.03 0.30
-0.506 0.27 -1.86 0.06
-0.535 0.28 -1.89 0.06
5.078 2.75 1.84 0.07
4.315 5.34 0.81 0.42
1.034 2.42 0.43 0.67
-1.136 0.58 -1.95 0.05
-0.050 0.01 -4.79 0.00
Yes
Yes
β SE
5.736 0.79
0.705 0.06
0.285 0.04
0.325 0.74
-0.044 0.11
0.096 0.03
-0.033 0.02
-2.001 0.89
-0.466 0.19
0.009 0.01
-0.043 0.32
0.009 0.00
-0.004 0.03
-0.662 0.44
0.535 0.20
-0.035 0.13
0.054 0.11
2.634 1.56
5.854 4.03
-3.092 1.80
-0.245 0.08
-0.025 0.01
Yes
Yes
-0.604 0.21
P>z
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.66
0.69
0.00
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.39
0.89
0.00
0.87
0.13
0.01
0.78
0.61
0.09
0.15
0.09
0.00
0.00
F-test
Wald χ2
R square 
45.2
0.64
0.00 43.8
0.65
0.00
710.7 0.00 984.2 0.00
Joint F-test (OLS) or χ2-test 9.95 0.00 23.21 0.00 24.24 0.00
Observations
Robust standard errors, two-ta
689
iled tests are reported for all m
689
odels.
323 671
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Appendix 3. Monitoring and Shareholder Gains from M&As
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (OLS) Model 3 (2SLS) Model 4 (Heckman)
Variable
Intercept
Firm size 
Growth
Profitability 
Same industry deal
Deal value 
M&A experience
Cash flows
Diversification
Career horizon
CEO gender
CEO stock options 
CEO ownership 
Leverage
Relative size
Nonconfident CEO
Antitakeover provisions
Industry munificence
Industry dynamism
Industry complexity
Board monitoring 
Owner monitoring
Industry
Year
Mills lambda
β SE
2.542 0.49
0.819 0.05
0.312 0.05
-0.826 0.55
0.245 0.11
0.046 0.04
0.013 0.01
-0.350 0.87
0.223 0.20
0.011 0.01
-0.147 0.48
0.011 0.00
-0.030 0.03
-0.232 0.42
0.131 0.26
-0.360 0.12
-0.321 0.11
2.696 1.37
6.018 2.85
1.097 1.43
Yes
Yes
P>t
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.03
0.19
0.12
0.69
0.28
0.19
0.76
0.00
0.30
0.59
0.61
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.04
0.44
β SE
3.642 0.56
0.754 0.05
0.304 0.05
-0.870 0.52
0.269 0.11
0.035 0.04
0.006 0.01
-0.341 0.84
0.233 0.20
0.013 0.01
-0.122 0.45
0.011 0.00
-0.030 0.03
-0.088 0.43
0.292 0.26
-0.377 0.12
-0.333 0.11
2.342 1.36
6.056 2.81
1.421 1.39
-0.129 0.08
-0.020 0.01
Yes
Yes
P>t
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.01
0.31
0.49
0.69
0.26
0.13
0.79
0.00
0.28
0.84
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.03
0.31
0.11
0.00
β SE
10.673 4.34
0.004 0.46
0.303 0.11
-0.835 0.75
0.207 0.21
-0.006 0.08
-0.067 0.05
0.104 1.88
0.378 0.41
0.093 0.05
-0.827 0.75
0.013 0.01
0.232 0.18
-0.274 0.92
1.287 1.09
-1.294 0.66
-1.319 0.52
-0.218 3.21
-1.111 5.69
-1.101 4.02
-2.564 1.69
-0.015 0.01
Yes
Yes
P>z
0.01
0.99
0.01
0.26
0.33
0.94
0.22
0.96
0.36
0.06
0.27
0.01
0.20
0.77
0.24
0.05
0.01
0.95
0.85
0.78
0.13
0.26
β SE
4.007 0.78
0.730 0.05
0.296 0.05
-0.915 0.53
0.312 0.11
0.037 0.03
-0.005 0.02
-0.362 0.84
0.191 0.20
0.017 0.01
-0.130 0.44
0.011 0.00
-0.042 0.03
-0.083 0.42
0.261 0.26
-0.374 0.12
-0.331 0.11
2.603 1.33
4.214 2.86
1.592 1.34
-0.149 0.08
-0.020 0.01
Yes
Yes
-0.190 0.24
P>z
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.01
0.30
0.76
0.67
0.35
0.05
0.77
0.00
0.12
0.84
0.32
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.14
0.24
0.06
0.00
F-test
Wald χ2
R square 
Joint F-test (OLS) or χ2-test
38.4
0.56
0.00 40.7
0.57
6.04
0.00
0.00
249.3
5.40
0.00
0.07
879.5
13.29
0.00
0.00
Observations
Robust standard errors, two-ta
762
iled tests are reported for all m
762
odels.
406 747
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Appendix 4. Monitoring and M&A Extremeness: Board Variables
Model 1 (OLS)
Variable
Intercept
Firm size 
Growth
Profitability 
Same industry deal
Deal value 
M&A experience
Cash flows
Diversification
Career horizon
CEO gender
CEO stock options 
CEO ownership 
Leverage
Relative size
Nonconfident CEO
Antitakeover provisions
Industry munificence
Industry dynamism
Industry complexity
Directors - equity based pay
Directors M&A experience
Board size
Busy directors
Board independence
CEO duality
Directors ownership
Ownership concentration
Industry
Year
β Robust SE 
4.191 0.42
0.743 0.04
0.292 0.03
-0.382 0.46
0.169 0.08
0.054 0.02
0.023 0.01
-0.698 0.61
-0.035 0.14
0.007 0.01
-0.188 0.37
0.009 0.00
-0.003 0.02
-0.632 0.30
0.563 0.15
-0.238 0.09
-0.140 0.08
3.173 1.03
7.354 2.31
-0.168 1.14
-0.002 0.00
-0.002 0.00
0.023 0.02
0.406 0.06
-0.717 0.26
-0.235 0.09
-0.019 0.00
-0.022 0.00
Yes
Yes
P>t
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.41
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.25
0.80
0.29
0.61
0.00
0.88
0.04
0.00
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.88
0.71
0.07
0.21
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
F-test
R square 
Joint F-test 
Observations
Robust standard errors, two-taile
70.3
0.62
10.73
1451
d tests.
0.00
0.00
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Appendix 5. Heckman M&A Selec
Variable
Firm size 
Growth
Profitability 
Cash flows
Institutional ownership 
M&A wave
CEO stock options 
CEO ownership 
Busy directors
Board size
Board independence
CEO duality
Directors M&A experience
Directors CEOs
Directors - absent
Directors - equity based pay
Directors ownership
Top owner stake (%)
Munificence
Dynamism
Complexity
M&A experience
Industry dedicated ownership
Industry transient ownership
Industry quasi-indexer ownership
Year
Industry
rho
sigma
lambda
Number of observations
Censored observations
Uncensored observations
tion Model
Model 1 (Heckman Firs
Coef. Robust SE 
0.138 0.03
0.025 0.02
0.551 0.30
0.576 0.40
-0.001 0.00
1.080 0.22
0.003 0.00
0.016 0.01
0.229 0.05
0.023 0.01
-0.352 0.17
-0.275 0.05
-0.009 0.00
-0.022 0.02
0.732 0.48
0.003 0.00
-0.009 0.00
-0.004 0.01
-0.137 0.69
-0.056 0.08
0.576 0.13
0.337 0.05
0.411 2.68
-4.596 2.45
7.581 1.55
Yes
Yes
-0.273 0.13
1.347 0.04
-0.367 0.18
4071
2653
1418
t Stage)
P>z
0.00
0.20
0.06
0.15
0.47
0.00
0.02
0.07
0.00
0.10
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.29
0.12
0.10
0.00
0.41
0.84
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.88
0.06
0.00
Robust standard errors, two-tailed tests.
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